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Abstract 
Development, in an age of globalizations, has indeed become a global project.   
However, this project remains contested and contestable.  While much attention has 
been given to this contestation at a macro-policy level, the dynamics of such 
contestations on the ground remain less studied.  Noting that development projects, 
policies and programs are themselves products of power relations and social struggles, 
this paper focuses on the dynamics of these relations and struggles in relation to the 
dissemination of the global development project in Malawi.  Drawing from the 
experiences and fractious journey from 2000 to 2006 of the broad-based civil society 
network involved in Malawi’s ongoing PRSP process, the paper shows how local 
actors draw creatively on globalized discourses of participation and representation to 
contest and confound the objectives of the elites, thereby complicating the channels 
through which the global development project is promulgated. 
 
 
Introduction 
Development, in an age of globalizations, has indeed become a global project.  Much 
attention has focused on the apparent global convergence on the objectives of this 
project as articulated both through its strongly normative ‘buzzwords’ such as 
democracy, participation, empowerment and poverty reduction (Cornwall and Brock, 
2005, Hickey and Mohan, 2004, Cooke and Kothari, 2001) and through its global 
frameworks such as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) (Weber 2007, 2006, Gould, 2005, Craig and 
Porter, 2002).  While the ubiquity of these concepts and frameworks within the 
development literature would appear to point to a global consensus on this project, 
this vigorous and lively critical literature reminds us that the project in fact remains 
both contested and contestable.   
 
At a macro level critical attention has been drawn to the role and power of both global 
frameworks and their attendant discourses in disseminating and consolidating the 
globalized development project.  Craig and Porter (2002), characterizing PRSPs as ‘a 
third way for the Third world’ argue that, in favoring technical and juridical 
components over the political economic, they represent a ‘mode of “inclusive” 
liberalism, in which the disciplined inclusion of the poor and their places is a central 
task’ (2002: 54 – emphasis in original).  Weber (2006) is of a similar view, arguing 
that PRSPs represent a comprehensive attempt to consolidate in legal (constitutional 
terms) as well as ideological and social terms, a unified political project for 
development.  Focusing on this project's attendant discourses, Cornwall and Brock 
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(2005) highlight how politically ambiguous ‘buzzwords’ and ‘fuzzwords’ such as 
poverty reduction, participation and empowerment are being used by elites to shape 
their practical application in ways which serve their own purposes together with those 
of the global development project.   
 
While, for some, the ‘tyranny of participation’ (Cooke and Kothari, 2001) leaves little 
scope for local resistance to the spread of this project as social forces dedicated to 
equality and accountability are undermined (Gould, 2005: 142), others draw attention 
to the inevitable contests for primacy between local and global imperatives and 
knowledge (Craig and Porter, 2002, Lazarus, 2008).  These contests are of specific 
interest to Weber (2006) who stresses the importance in exploring the social and 
political contexts in which PRSP policies are implemented as it is here, she asserts 
(2006: 189) that ‘the contradictory, strategic and contested nature of the [global 
development] project can be exposed.’  In a later paper, noting the global relational 
dimensions to such struggles, Weber (2007) argues for the incorporation of such 
social struggles as an analytic category into research in this area as it contributes to 
the foregrounding of the contested nature of development.   
 
In this paper I attempt to contribute to this literature by moving from the macro level 
to the micro and examining the interface where the global development project meets 
with local imperatives, knowledges and concerns.  Focusing on the dynamics of local 
relations and struggles in relation to the dissemination of the global development 
project throughout Malawi, in particular as promulgated through the ongoing PRSP 
process, I demonstrate how local actors draw creatively on globalized discourses of 
participation and representation to contest and confound the objectives of the elites, 
thereby complicating the channels through which the global development project is 
promulgated.  Drawing from the experiences and the fractious journey from 2000 to 
2006 of the principal civic network involved in Malawi’s PRSP process, the Malawi 
Economic Justice Network (MEJN), I show that the ‘disciplined inclusion’, as Craig 
and Porter (2002: 53) term it, of ‘the poor’ into the neo-liberal order has met with 
resistance as local actors, appropriating and harnessing globalized ‘fuzzwords’ of 
participation and representation to challenge elites, have significantly complicated the 
channels through which the project is disseminated.  I argue that, while ideologically 
loaded, global development concepts and discourses can nonetheless serve as 
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powerful political tools, fuelling imaginations and actions in the ongoing struggle 
against the inequities generated by the global development project.   
 
Fieldwork for this study was carried out over two summers (2005 and 2006) in 
Malawi.  Semi-structured interviews were conducted with forty-five state and civic 
actors.  These included both people involved in the ongoing PRSP process and 
commentators on the evolving socio-political climate more generally.  In addition, I 
carried out a piece of research (which was commissioned by MEJN) during the first 
summer on the network’s District Chapter Program (see below).  Involving extensive 
travel throughout the country with MEJN staff and interviews with many of its local 
'members', this facilitated a more in-depth study of the network’s culture, practices 
and ongoing challenges, providing a rich source of material on evolving relations 
within the network and beyond.  The specific case of MEJN provides a doorway into 
the multiple sites of struggle in Malawi, and the actions of its different actors illustrate 
concrete ways in which globalized discourses and frameworks may be locally 
employed to challenge and contest the spread of the global development project.  In 
this manner, MEJN’s specificity provides us with ways of thinking more generally 
about how local contestation takes place in a globalized world.   
 
The argument advanced in this paper proceeds as follows.  A brief overview of the 
context for the introduction of the PRSP to Malawi is firstly provided wherein it is 
noted that a long legacy of external intervention has resulted in a deep penetration of 
globalized discourses and debates across Malawian society.  Introducing the 
theoretical framework employed in the study which draws heavily on the work of 
Michel Foucault, I go on to argue that the dissemination and exercise of power, 
including the power of globalized discourses and frameworks, is less a zero-sum game 
between the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’, than a dynamic, with the potential to 
challenge as well as to consolidate dominant frameworks and prescriptions.  The third 
section of the paper then employs Foucault’s theorization to chart the MEJN 
network’s arduous journey within and without the process, from its inception as a 
dynamic new force mobilizing marginalized voices throughout Malawian society, 
through its disciplined and disciplining actions excluding these voices, and onto its 
struggle and re-invention in response to popular charges of illegitimacy.  Drawing 
from the views and analyses of MEJN's local 'members', I demonstrate that the 
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'disciplined' inclusion of the poor into the neo-liberal project is far more problematic 
than its proponents and agents may realise.  The findings demonstrate that 
contestation is alive and well in towns and villages throughout Malawi.  I conclude by 
arguing that the specificity of MEJN’s case, in drawing our attention to the shifting 
dynamics of how politics in conducted more broadly in the globalized world, 
highlights the need for further empirical work at these micro-sites of ongoing struggle 
and contestation.   
 
Malawi: PRSP and globalized discourses 
From its colonization in 1889 to its independence in 1963, and on through the 
structural adjustment years from 1981 onwards, Malawi has a long history of western 
penetration into its economy, politics and society.  Colonialism, with the introduction 
of corporate enterprise and wage labor, together with the commodization of peasant 
agriculture through cash crop production, brought significant changes in political and 
economic structures (Kanyongolo, 1998).  Western influence continued, following 
independence, with Hastings Banda’s modernist development vision (paradoxically 
combined with a strong ethnic (Chewa) cultural traditionalism) being nurtured 
through a close relationship with western donors (Mkandawire, 2003).  Global 
influences were set to increase when, following the oil shock of the late 1970s and the 
attendant declining terms of trade, rising interest rates and declining aid (exacerbated 
by a drought in 1980-1981 and the influx of refugees from war-ravaged 
Mozambique), in 1981 Malawi became the first African country to succumb to the 
IMFs structural adjustment program (Chinsinga, 2002).   
 
In Malawi, as elsewhere, the structural adjustment years resulted in the twin-edged 
sword of increasing poverty and indebtedness.  The gini ratio deteriorated from 0.48 
in 1968 to 0.61 in 1995 (Chirwa, 1997b in Chilowa, 1998: 556) while external debt 
stocks rose from US$ 0.9 billion in 1982 to US$ 2.7 billion in 1999 (World 
Development Indicators Online).  In 2000, Malawi qualified for the IMF/World Bank 
Highly Indebted Poor Country (HIPC) initiative under which the government was 
obliged undertake the PRSP process in order to qualify for debt relief.  Malawi's 
PRSP formulation process began in late 2000, following IMF and World Bank 
approval of an interim PRSP strategy in December 2000.  The resultant three-year 
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strategy was formally launched in April of 2002 (Jenkins and Tsoka, 2003).  
Following its completion work began, in mid-2005, developing a follow-on strategy.  
This five-year strategy, known as the Malawi Growth and Development Strategy 
(MGDS) brings together elements of the PRSP and an economic growth strategy, the 
Malawi Economic Growth Strategy (MEGS).  It was completed in 2006 and launched 
in early 2007. 
 
The PRSP process, in theory, heralded a new departure in national governance in that 
development policy was no longer to be dictated from the plush interiors of the World 
Bank’s headquarters in Washington.  In contrast, PRSPs were to be country-driven 
and participatory, with all relevant stakeholders participating in both their formulation 
and implementation (World Bank, 2002).  In Malawi however, where such a broad-
based participatory approach represented a radical shift from traditional hierarchical 
political relations (Booth et al, 2006, Patel, 2005), the initial process was slow.  In 
2001 as the process commenced, just four civil society organizations were invited by 
the state to participate in the strategy formulation process.  These included two 
international NGOs (Oxfam and Action Aid), a German research institute (the Konrad 
Adenauer foundation), and the state umbrella organization for NGOs (the Congress of 
NGOs in Malawi, CONGOMA).   No radical change seemed likely therefore as the 
traditional dyad of donors and state appeared set to continue.  However, these 
traditional relations were jarred as members of the country’s Jubilee campaign for 
debt cancellation, learning of the process through the campaign’s global networks, 
and emboldened by the process’ normative participatory claims, pushed for 
involvement.  Spurred on by globalized discourses of participation, Jubilee campaign 
members decided to form a broad-based network, thereafter known as the Malawi 
Economic Justice Network (MEJN), to lobby for inclusion in the PRSP process.  With 
initial funding from Oxfam International, MEJN, a loose network of, initially, twenty-
seven Malawian NGOs, religious groups, academics, trade unions and community 
groups, was thus formed with the express intention of opening up the political space 
provided by the PRSP, affording a voice to the most marginalized and challenging 
traditional elite relations.  However, as we will see, the network has traveled a long 
and rocky road since that time as network leaders have attempted to mediate relations 
within and outside of the dominant hegemonic terrain that is encompassed in 
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Malawi’s PRSP.  Before tracking this journey however, let us first turn to the 
theoretical framework employed in doing so. 
 
In pursuit of the invisible: Analyzing power relations 
Many critical analyses of PRSP processes to date have drawn, either implicitly or 
explicitly, on neo-Gramscian or constructivist frameworks of analysis where the focus 
has been on the policy outcomes of different processes.  These analyses have proven 
extremely useful in highlighting the hegemonic ideologies, policies and practices 
which underpin PRSPs worldwide, irrespective of the country in which they are 
based.  In this paper I attempt to build on this work by focusing on the mechanisms 
through which this hegemony is disseminated at local level and the power dynamics 
around these.  This paper is thus less a contribution to the ‘what’ of the globalized 
development project, than the ‘how’.  A Foucauldian framework has been chosen as 
most appropriate to the task as Foucault provides a framework through which the 
‘how’ – the mechanisms of power – may be analyzed over time regardless of their 
function or outcome.  As he notes in a lecture delivered in 1980 ‘if power is exercised, 
what sort of exercise does it involve?  In what does it consist?  What is its 
mechanism?’ (1980: 89).  In particular, Foucault’s focus both on discourse as an 
‘instrument of domination’ (1980: 95) and his ‘capillary’ conception of power (1980: 
96) come closer to the dynamism which underpins political relations over time and so 
prove particularly useful to the analysis of local dynamics around Malawi’s PRSP 
process examined here.   
 
In Foucault’s perspective, power is something which circulates among people.  
Accordingly, power may not only pressurize individuals and/or groups to conform to 
prevailing or dominant norms, truths, and knowledge (such as that embodied within 
the global development project), but may also move in another direction toward the 
development and articulation of new norms, truths and knowledge.  Foucault’s 
interest specifically lies with the agents – groups and individuals – of power and the 
mechanisms whereby they exercise this power.  ‘We need to identify the agents 
responsible for them (repressions and exclusions), their real agents… and not be 
content to lump them under the formula of a generalised bourgeoise.  We need to see 
how these mechanisms of power… have begun to become economically advantageous 
and politically useful.’ (1980: 101).   
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While much of Foucault’s work focuses on highlighting the ‘disciplining’ and 
controlling force of power over individuals (in particular in his work Discipline and 
Punish where he asserts that ‘discipline produces subjected and practiced bodies, 
‘docile’ bodies’ (1977: 138)), he consistently draws attention to how power circulates, 
transforming individuals, groups and networks.  Its transformatory nature is thus also 
evident whereby its mechanisms ‘have been – and continue to be - invested, 
colonized, utilized, involuted, transformed, displaced, extended, etc…’ (1980: 99).  
Following Foucault’s theory of power, norms are constantly being remolded, 
processes and procedures transformed.  As power circulates, political relations are 
thus in a state of constant renegotiation and transformation.   
 
One of the principal mechanisms through which such power is exercised and extended 
is, according to Foucault, through discourse.  Discourses shape not only what is said 
and done but also what is say-able and do-able in any given social space, constituting 
what counts as knowledge and whose knowledge counts.  Iris Marion Young has 
defined discourse as follows: 
…the system of stories and expert knowledge diffused through society, which 
convey the widely accepted generalizations about how society operates that 
are theorized in those terms, as well as the social norms and cultural values to 
which most of the people appeal when discussing their social and political 
problems and proposed solutions. 
        (Young, 2003: 115) 
 
 
Within this perspective, power is established, exercised and consolidated through 
discourse which, in turn, shapes what is understood as knowledge and ‘truth’ within 
particular fields such as public policy.   Foucault argues that particular forms of 
knowledge or discourses vie with each other for control or power over what becomes 
established as the ‘truth’. 
 
…in a society such as ours, but basically in any society, there are manifold 
relations of power which permeate, characterize and constitute the social 
body, and these relations of power cannot themselves be established, 
consolidated nor implemented without the production, accumulation, 
circulation and functioning of a discourse. There can be no possible exercise 
of power without a certain economy of discourses of truth which operates 
through and on the basis of this association.  We are subjected to the 
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production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except 
through the production of truth.  
       (1980: 93) 
 
Discourses, like power, can thus be transformed, thereby transforming knowledge and 
truth.  The key factor here, Foucault asserts, is ‘a modification in the rules of 
formation of statements which are accepted as scientifically true’ (1980: 112).  It is 
not the content of the statements (or submissions or positions in the case of policy 
fora), but the rules which dictate how they should look, what form they should take, 
which is key.  And we will see, this is a key issue in relation to what discourses 
dominate within Malawi’s ongoing PRSP process.  We now turn to an examination of 
this in an exploration of the political implications of the process.     
 
The political implications of Malawi’s PRSP: MEJN’s journey 
As we have already briefly seen, the PRSP with its allied discourses of participation 
and poverty reduction provided an initial opportunity to prise open the traditionally 
narrow political space, offering the potential to transform political relations.  
However, relations, like power and discourse, are dynamic.  While traditional political 
relations may be challenged, the forces favoring their consolidation remain strong.  
This section charts MEJN’s journey within and without the dominant hegemonic 
discursive terrain of the ongoing PRSP process and illustrates how globalized 
discourses have been employed by different actors, both to challenge and to 
consolidate traditional relations at different times throughout the process.   
 
Promising beginnings:  Challenging relations and colonizing spaces 
In late 2000, MEJN entered the political arena as a formidable force, drawing on the 
power of its global networks to open a space for its members in the PRSP process.  
Aware that their difficulties in gaining access to meetings and information made a 
mockery of its participatory claims, MEJN’s leaders quickly colonized (in a 
Foucauldian sense) and capitalized on the globalized norms of the process.  As one of 
the founding members explains, an email claiming that participation within the 
process was ‘just a joke’ sent across global networks proved instrumental in securing 
the network a place in the process.   
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And that [the email] actually was the clinch because immediately after that 
there was a meeting of all the heads of [the PRSP] thematic groups in the 
ministry, and then they called us in and they said ‘ok, you want to participate 
now, let’s make you participate’.  And they were actually quite annoyed that 
this had gone out on the internet.  And it actually, I think it was what clinched 
things. 
        (MEJN member) 
 
And so, by throwing a global spotlight on the Malawian state’s hollow claims to 
participation, MEJN managed, at the outset, to open up the process and colonize to 
some degree the political space afforded.  Through its lobbying employing both 
national and global media, network leaders gained places for its members in seventeen 
of the process’s twenty-one thematic working groups.  Moreover, again invoking the 
discourse of ‘participation’ imbuing the process and arguing that the three-month 
timeframe left insufficient time to consult with member groups and their constituents, 
network leaders also succeeded in extending the overall timeframe for the formulation 
process to nine months in total.  There was a widespread mood of optimism with the 
process and many people genuinely seemed to feel that the political space had been 
opened and that power was shifting with political elites being challenged and a wider 
range of voices engaged.  This period proved short-lived however as the power 
balance again shifted and network members quickly moved from harnessing and 
transforming to internalizing and passively adopting the dominant discursive norms of 
the process and the global development project it espoused.   
 
 
Internalizing globalized discourses: disciplining members 
 
While securing a politics of presence within the process was MEJN’s first priority, 
very quickly Foucault’s ‘disciplining’ came into play with the network’s leadership 
resolving that, to develop its status as a ‘serious’ player, certain norms of behavior 
were required.  The dominant discourse within the process was highly technocratic 
and dominated by a ‘problem-solving’ approach.  Within this framework, technical 
policy discourses were privileged and the opportunities for what we might call 
‘problem-framing’ or an examination of the underlying causes of these problems and 
their connection to the global development project were foreclosed.  Significantly, 
these norms were quickly internalized by MEJN leaders who attribute their growing 
status to their technical competencies.  As the network’s director notes… 
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I think the caliber of people we featured in the TWGs [thematic working 
groups] but also in the drafting, the technical drafting team of the PRSP, was 
caliber that wouldn’t be doubted, by the government, the donors, and 
everybody else. 
       (MEJN director) 
 
These norms left no room for more emotive forms of communication and behavior 
favored by many of MEJN’s member associations.   
 
Many civil society organizations in Malawi, they just want to make noise out 
of emotions without investing in the research.  This unwillingness to invest 
even in proper human resources has been a stumbling block.   
        (MEJN staff member) 
 
The extent of the network leaders’ internalization of these dominant communicative 
and behavioral norms is apparent from a comment by MEJN’s director in 2006, five 
years on from his first involvement in the PRSP process, on the substance of 
development policy from his point of view - ‘these documents, time and again, should 
have a matrix which should contain detail on the activities that are going to be 
done…’.  Thus, à la Foucault’s theory of disciplining, ‘truth’ is now seen as emerging 
through dominant, technocratic norms of communication and practice.   
 
Following completion of the formulation of the first PRSP strategy in 2001, the 
network decided that its focus should move to monitoring the strategy’s 
implementation.  This move corresponded to donor interest in monitoring the use of 
funds and countering corruption, part of the globalized ‘good governance’ agenda that 
dominates public discourse in Malawi.  With MEJN moving into a new area of work 
which dovetailed neatly with the global aid agenda, additional demands began to be 
placed on network members.  Donor funds began to drive the work of the network in 
new and somewhat disparate directions, with a focus on monitoring of policy 
outcomes rather than, as was originally envisaged, challenging traditional political 
relations and opening up a space for network members themselves.   A board member 
outlines the problem, 
But part of the MEJN lack of funding made us look for funding and sometimes 
go into kind of agreements that weren’t very good.  And it kind of scattered 
our attention a little bit all over the place… instead of being more focused and 
maybe sticking to some of the original objectives that we had set. 
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               (MEJN board member) 
 
As the years evolved, MEJN successfully secured funds and carried out programs in a 
wide range of areas including budget training for NGOs and government officials, 
budget monitoring and research (on trade, service delivery and maize distribution).2  
Its public profile grew significantly and network leaders made regular appearances in 
the press and on the airwaves.  Funding support diversified and MEJN, by late 2006, 
was receiving support from over ten donors3, the majority of whom fund specific 
programs of their choosing.  And so, it appears that MEJN had moved significantly 
from its original mandate of colonizing political spaces by securing broad-based 
participation in the PRSP and allied political processes, to what, reflecting the 
widespread popularity of the globalized ‘good governance’ discourse, is now 
ubiquitously referred to as its ‘watchdog role’.  In this, MEJN’s trajectory has seen it 
move from a broad-based activist network challenging elite relations to something 
more akin to the globalized normative NGO so beloved of donors at the beginning of 
the ‘good governance’ era (see Hulme and Edwards (1997) for an overview of the rise 
of NGOs during this period).     
 
These developments were not without their challenges however.  Most significantly 
they necessitated a shift in network members’ own direction and strategy, requiring 
them to move from more active campaigning and direct representation of their own 
members views and perspectives, to new, more technical, ‘professionalized’ areas of 
work, such as budget monitoring.  However, despite training workshops run by the 
network’s leadership, member organizations proved resistant to these changes, 
resisting an internalization of the dominant norms, or the ‘disciplining’ being pressed 
upon them by network leaders.  With network members refusing to comply with the 
PRSP process’ discursive, communicative and behavioral requirements, network 
leaders decided to take on an increasing amount of work directly themselves.  The 
network’s director (in a move perhaps reflecting these shifts, as the years evolved the 
coordinator’s role became transformed into that of a director) explains the challenges 
these shifts posed.  
 
But this shift … has brought with it a number of challenges.  Because the 
expectation in the membership of MEJN has been that they would be involved 
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in the actual implementation of economic governance activities or programs 
that MEJN has on the ground.  Now the first challenge that this has come with 
has been that the organization members of MEJN have not sufficiently 
reworked their work plans, or their own programs to have like a specific line 
on economic governance.  Which means that any direct link to implementation 
has been left to the [MEJN] secretariat.  
(MEJN director) 
 
 
Moreover, reflecting its increasingly ‘professional’ profile, MEJN secretariat 
members were now selected from an elite class.  A third level education was now 
required to work within the secretariat.   
 
I think one positive thing that has seen MEJN moving much more 
tremendously than the other organizations is our pragmatic approach in terms 
of staffing, because we say the minimum is we are going to recruit somebody 
who has got say a Bachelors degree, or indeed whose experience is closer to 
having a Bachelors degree.              
               (MEJN director) 
 
With MEJN leaders increasing the size of the secretariat and increasingly taking on 
much of the work themselves, conflict was inevitable.  Network members, feeling 
excluded and sidelined, accused MEJN leaders of turning the network into an NGO.  
In the words of one member… 
 
MEJN is a network.  They should not be implementers.  Let them use their 
members…  Of course there have been some clashes between MEJN and their 
members… And people have moved away from getting interested in MEJN.  
Because MEJN wants to be the implementer.  … I think that’s a conflict, that’s 
where the conflict comes in now.  So let them identify what is their role.  Are 
they facilitators or implementers?  MEJN is not an NGO.  The way I 
understand it, it is a network.  
(Representative of MEJN member organization) 
 
 
While some of this acrimony may well be due to competition for resources (‘NGO-
ism’ is big business in Malawi, as elsewhere), it is clear that MEJN had strayed far 
from its original objectives and mandate.  Its leaders were effectively closing the 
political space and consolidating hegemonic elite relations.  They were perhaps 
facilitated in this attempted disciplining and control over the membership by 
dominant cultural norms.  Malawian society has been described as comprising 
hierarchical and asymmetric structures and systems in which loyalty and conformity 
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to political leaders remains strong, and conflict and dissensus is not readily tolerated.  
(Booth et al, 2006, Patel, 2005, Englund, 2002, 2003).  These features clearly lie at 
odds with the discourses of participation and democracy espoused by the globalized 
development project and its frameworks.   
 
However, political cultures are neither static nor immutable and, while evolving 
trends are difficult to analyze, evidence from recent attitudinal surveys 
(Afrobarometer (2003) data as analyzed by Khaila and Chibwana (2005)), combined 
with popular discourse, as recorded in Malawian media, suggest that, although 
adherence to liberal values remains strong, trust in political leaders has fallen 
significantly.   Newspaper articles with headlines such as Why our leaders fail4; The 
State of Malawi5; Political leaders need to consider cost of impasse6; and Never trust 
politicians7, to cite a few, exemplify the widespread disillusionment and distrust of 
political leaders.  An excerpt from the latter article provides a flavor of public 
perceptions of politics in contemporary Malawi 
 
But then politics in Malawi is always seen as an all-important opening to 
social cachet and wealth… Avarice, jealousy, distrust and hate soon give birth 
to uncontrollable political maelstroms and fierce fighting erupts.  More 
struggles, more defections, more noise and more change.  And to bank my 
trust on people with inflated egos and bloated self-interest, politicians who 
can’t make up their minds on one thing and stick to it?  No thanks.8 
 
Undoubtedly, this debate is fuelled by the globalized ‘good governance’ discourse 
which is well rehearsed throughout Malawian society.  Notably, this critique of 
political leaders extends to those within the civic sector also in Malawi however 
where global cynicism with the mushrooming of NGOs among Southern professionals 
(see Lewis and Opoku-Mensah, 2006 and Pearce, 2000) has fuelled a growing public 
critique in Malawi.  In particular, global critiques of NGOs as ‘charlatans racking up 
large salaries… and many air-conditioned offices’ (Holloway, 1999 - cited in Pearce, 
2000: 4) operating within a neo-liberal agenda and failing to represent the poor 
(Ayers, 2006, de Santisteban, 2005  Roy, 2003, Tembo, 2003) are mirrored within 
popular discourse on Malawi.   
 
Certainly MEJN appears guilty of many, if not all of these charges, as it appears that 
that the impetus at the time of its establishment – that of bringing a wider set of voices 
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espousing the concerns and agendas of the poor thereby challenging elite political 
relations – had become over-ridden by the agendas of funding agencies – the 
professional requirements of which led to a widening gap between the network’s 
leadership, its membership and the people it was purporting to represent.  However 
MEJN’s story does not end here as wider national debates and critiques, in turn 
informed by global debates, began to make their mark and the narrowing of the 
political space was once more challenged. 
 
Appropriating global debates and discourses: Contesting the global development 
project  
 
With the growing gap between its members and the secretariat occurring at a time 
when MEJN was gaining national and international renown through its widespread 
use of the mass media, the network’s leadership began to find itself confronted with 
charges of illegitimacy, both from within its own membership and within Malawi 
society more broadly.  From its early days of relying on the World Bank’s Voices of 
the Poor (Naryan et al, 2000) as a basis for its inputs to the PRSP, MEJN’s leadership 
was faced with a growing public consciousness that the network had not consolidated 
a grassroots base which might feed into policy and advocacy activities, thereby 
putting into practice the theory of ‘participatory economic governance’9 that the 
network espoused.  Indeed, with policy and programs in the country becoming more 
and more decentralized following the global, post-Cold War penchant for 
decentralization, the MEJN network appeared the very embodiment of the ‘elite’ 
NGO divorced from its roots as depicted in the critical development literature of the 
late 1990s.   The network remained largely urban-based, purporting to represent the 
poor, yet with an office and entire staff in Lilongwe.  In 2002, cognizant of these 
issues and attempting to respond to public critiques, MEJN’s leadership began to 
build a local network of representation in the form of what became known as the 
District Chapter Program.   
 
MEJN’s District Chapter Program consists of locally elected voluntary committees of 
eight to ten people who aim to represent the interests of their communities at district 
level.  Committees have been established in twenty-seven of Malawi’s twenty-nine 
districts.  Each district has its own local government in line with the country’s 
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decentralization policy.  Committees consist principally of representatives of both 
local NGOs and local community-based associations including youth groups, 
women’s groups, faith-based groups, and trade and business associations.   
 
This new model for the network represents an interesting development in a number of 
ways.  First, it unveils the richness and diversity that is civil society in Malawi.  
Contrary to many accounts in the literature which, equating civil society with the 
NGO partners of the globalized neo-liberal order, speak of civil society as a relatively 
‘undeveloped’ phenomenon (see for example Chirwa, 2000 on Malawi) - a form of 
what Comaroff and Comaroff call ‘social revisioning’ (1999: 3), Malawian civil 
society has long encompassed a diverse range of associations underlain by complex 
webs of values, priorities and relations (see Lwanda, 2005 for a unique, non-
revisionist account of Malawian civic associationalism).  In tapping into this diversity, 
MEJN has challenged many of the normative assumptions upon which it was founded 
and, with global backing, certainly developed.  Second, the innovative model, linking 
MEJN’s ‘elites’ at national level with associations and groups on the ground, 
potentially provides a channel for local voices to articulate their knowledges and 
truths thereby offering the potential to transform political relations, both at local level, 
and nationally.  And third, this development illustrates the power and potential of 
globalized discourses and debates to challenge and contest the network (in this case 
both charges of illegitimacy from the wider arena of Malawian civil society, including 
the media, and the globalized policy of decentralization with its attendant discourse of 
participatory governance10) despite its consolidated relations with both the state and 
international donors11.  
 
Responding to public critiques, MEJN’s leaders’ aim in developing the District 
Chapter structure was to institutionalize a national structure of representation which 
would enable the secretariat to bring people’s issues from the ground – their local 
knowledges – to the national policy arena.  However, the discursive requirements at 
national level were left unchallenged and the ‘disciplined inclusion of the poor’ did 
indeed seem to be the order of the day.  Representation was to be achieved by Chapter 
committee members systematically gathering data and information in specified areas 
(food security, health, education etc.) and feeding this upwards to the secretariat for 
what MEJN, in the globalized discourse of the PRSP process, terms its ‘evidence 
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based advocacy’12.  Significantly however, Chapter members have a very different 
vision of their role.  In interviews, Chapter committee members in eight different 
districts all emphasized that wished to represent their local communities by bringing 
issues of local concern and interest to local government structures and ameliorating 
the rapidly deteriorating living conditions experienced since the advent of structural 
adjustment.  In particular, members were interested in moving beyond the main town 
within the district (where many committee members live) and going out to villages 
and settlements in outlying areas.  Members were emphatic that MEJN’s role lay in 
facilitating people at the grassroots to articulate their views, concerns and analyses.  
As one Chapter member put it… ‘MEJN is for the people… If MEJN is only for the 
boma [district main town] then we are a failure.  It’s the people in the grassroots who 
need MEJN more’.  There is, therefore, clearly a divergence of views on the role and 
function of local committee structures.  While for MEJN’s disciplined leadership, 
having internalized dominant norms of communication and discourse, this structure is 
there to collect ‘evidence’, i.e. carry out research on specific areas as selected by the 
MEJN’s leadership (often following donor requirements), committee members, 
employing more popular forms of communication and alternative discourses, appear 
to view their role as a portal for the views and perspectives of local ‘communities’ (in 
itself a problematic concept and generally mediated through the local TA (Traditional 
Authority13)) to be fed upward to key decision makers, both through their own 
Chapter committee representatives at district level, and through those of the MEJN 
secretariat at national level.   
 
This bifurcation is not lost on Chapter members.  Repeatedly the question of 
representation was raised by committee members, as articulated by one member… 
‘who do we represent – do we represent MEJN or do we represent our 
communities?’.  When prompted to respond to their own question, committee 
members replied that they felt they represented their communities and that MEJN 
leaders should facilitate them in doing so.  The committee members’ question is 
illuminating in that it highlights the contradiction between the discursive and 
communicative norms adopted by MEJN within the PRSP process and the competing 
discourses of local communities.  In this, it highlights the contestation between 
dominant and local knowledges and the power relations circulating around these.  
While MEJN’s leaders, enmeshed in donor and state relations, are keen to direct 
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committees in meeting donor and state agendas by collating select pieces of evidence 
to support its ‘evidence-based advocacy’, thereby forestalling agendas and issues that 
might be raised, committees themselves, enmeshed in local relations, appear more 
keen to take their agendas from local ‘communities’ (however these may be defined), 
thereby offering a channel to communities through less bounded, open dialogue and 
communication, challenging and complicating the channels through which the global 
development project is disseminated.   
 
Committee members have begun to challenge MEJN’s leadership to listen to and 
support their plans for the future.  A number of committees have put forward concrete 
plans for projects they wish to carry out, and there are calls for more supports and less 
directives from MEJN’s leaders.  It would seem that the heretofore-neglected local 
associations and actors within Malawian civil society countrywide have found their 
political voice and are keen to use it.   Illustrating the capillarity of power and 
discourse as theorized by Foucault, local actors have become vocal and active in both 
contesting the validity of the global development project and in complicating its key 
channel of dissemination, the MEJN network.   
 
While MEJN struggles to maintain its status within the PRSP process therefore, in 
itself a crucial portal to national policy fora more broadly, its locally-based 
membership, emboldened by global debates on the contested meanings of ‘good 
governance’, ‘participation’, and ‘poverty reduction’, lies waiting in the wings, with 
members of some District Chapter committees becoming increasingly vocal about 
MEJN support in their efforts to bring their diverse knowledges, truths and discourses 
to national level, thereby putting into practice the real ‘participative governance’ that 
network leaders espouse. It remains to be seen how MEJN leaders will negotiate the 
conflicting normative demands of the state and donors on the one hand, and Chapter 
members and their ‘communities’ on the other. One thing is clear however, bridging 
these relations and poised with one foot in, and one foot out of the hegemonic order, 
MEJN’s journey has served to demonstrate how, at the micro-sites of struggle and 
contestation, globalized discourses and frameworks can be harnessed and 
appropriated to both challenge as well as to consolidate traditional political relations.  
In this, MEJN’s experience demonstrates that the disciplined inclusion of the poor 
within the global hegemonic order is far from an easy task. 
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Conclusion 
While the onward march of the global development project, through its strongly 
normative discourses and frameworks, is certainly a grave cause for concern, this 
march is not agentless, nor is it inevitable.  Much attention has rightly been focused 
on the project’s prominent promoters, those who stand to gain.  However attention 
also needs to be paid to what some might term its ‘subjects’, those who will lose, 
economically, politically and culturally, as they become increasingly marginalized by 
the neo-liberal tenets of the globalized project.  While an impressive body of literature 
on new social movements has highlighted resistance to this project in celebrated sites 
such as Porto Alegre and Seattle, MEJN’s experience demonstrates that such 
resistance is also alive and well in more ‘ordinary’ sites, and among more ‘ordinary’ 
individuals. 
 
And within these sites, remote yet globalized, politics appears to be changing.  
Inspired by global discourses and frameworks new tools have emerged which, 
fuelling imaginations, are being appropriated to challenge the channels through which 
the global development project is disseminated.  Viewed through the specific case of 
MEJN, Malawians nationwide appear to be less subjects than citizens, active and 
vocal in contesting their own disciplined inclusion within the global development 
project.   
 
Is Malawi’s case unique?  Are Malawians unique?  Perhaps so, but they stand 
together with countless other ‘ordinary’ individuals, restless and angry at the failures 
of modernization.  A country placed close to the bottom of most development 
indices14, its people are all too aware of the failings of the global development project 
and have found new tools with which to fight it.  The ongoing journey of MEJN and 
its many adherents and critics, in drawing our attention to the shifting dynamics of 
how politics in conducted more broadly in the globalized world, highlights the need 
for further empirical work at these – in many ways more ordinary, and for this reason, 
all the more inspiring – micro-sites of ongoing struggle and contestation.  
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Notes 
1. One of the principal initiatives in the ‘post-democracy’ era is NICE (the National Initiative for 
Civic Education).  This is a comprehensive programme of voter education which, in place since 
1999 and funded by the EU, operates throughout the country with offices and staff in all 
districts. 
2. At the time of field research (2005-2006) MEJN’s core staff had increased from one to seven 
with some research work being outsourced to consultants. 
3. MEJN donors include the following: the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), 
Christian Aid, the German development agency, Deutscher Entwicklungsdienst (DED), the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID), Capacity Building International Germany 
(InWENT), Irish Aid, the Open Society Initiative for Africa (OSISA), the US-based National 
Democratic Institute (NDI), Oxfam International and Trócaire.  
4. The Sunday Times, October 9th, 2005. 
5. Opinion, Kamkwamba Kalea, The Nation, October 10th, 2005. 
6. Editorial, The Nation, October 5th, 2005. 
7. Levi Kabwato, The Sunday Times, September 25th, 2005. 
8. Levi Kabwato, The Sunday Times, September 25th, 2005.  
9. See MEJN Programme Support Document (MEJN, 2004). 
10. The new Constitution Act No. 7 of 1995 (Chapter XIV) provided for the creation of local 
government authorities whose responsibilities include the promotion of local democratic 
participation. 
11. It should be acknowledged that, cognisant of wider critiques, these relations also appear to be 
increasingly dependent on MEJN demonstrating an institutional capacity to represent the poor. 
12. See MEJN Programme Support Document (MEJN, 2004). 
13. In Malawian political life elements of both modern and traditional co-exist.  TAs or Chiefs, a 
hereditary title, form part of the local government structures (together with locally elected 
councillors and MPs) and mediate many local, community-based, socio-political relations. 
14. For example Malawi occupies 166th place (out of 177 countries) in the United Nations 
Development Programme’s Human Development Index (UNDP, 2006). 
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